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ABSTRACT
This paper highlights the nexus of interactions among financial, industrial and 
macroeconomic factors determining the Pareto optimal date in which the firm’s claimants stop 
collaborating and force the firm into bankruptcy. The derived bankruptcy condition 
summarises the effects of valatility of the aggregate consumer income and the overall price level 
which affect the firm’s expected earnings, as well as the effects of depreciation, foregone 
interest on alternative usages of the loan extended to the firm and the level of risk perceived by 
the firm’s claimants from continued collaboration. The subsequent econometric analysis 
focuses on the effects of the macroeconomic factors and shows that variations in the GNP and 
the GNP deflator affect the rate of bankruptcy in the U.S. significantly.
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I INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to develop a sufficient condition for bankruptcy within a 
framework which takes into account the nexus of interactions among financial, industrial and 
macroeconomic factors characterising the environment in which firms operate. These 
interactions appear to have attracted insufficient attention in previous studies in the field of 
bankruptcy. Special emphasis will be given in both the theoretical model and empirical analysis 
to the role of fluctuations in macroeconomic variables. The conceptual approach is influenced 
by the works of Bulow and Shoven (1978), Ang and Chua (1980) and White (1980) on the 
financial aspects; and by the works of Altman (1971) and Gordon (1971) on the 
macroeconomic aspects of bankruptcy. The analysis refers to a financially distressed firm 
operating in a oligopolistic industry and facing a random demand for its product due to 
fluctuations of aggregate consumer income and overall price level.
Though financial distress is a necessary condition for bankruptcy it is not a sufficient 
one. Bulow and Shoven (1978) argue that the criterion for bankruptcy is a positive gain to the 
coalition of the firm's claimants from immediate liquidation of the firm. Our analysis of the 
sufficient condition for bankruptcy adopts a similar approach in which the financially distressed 
firm is forced into bankruptcy if the potentially collaborating claimants perceive the net returns 
from continuation to be insufficient. It extends Bulow and Shoven's criterion by considering 
certain industrial structure and stochastic macroeconomic conditions affecting the firm's 
operation as well as the firm's claimants' risk attitude.
Along these lines the paper continues as follows. Section II develops a conceptual 
model which presents the firm claimants' evaluation of the net returns from continuation. 
Section III derives the Pareto optimal collaboration period and presents the condition for 
immediate liquidation of the financially distressed firm. Section IV provides an aggregate 
econometric analysis of the effects of variations of macroeconomic factors suggested in the 
preceding sections on the rate of bankruptcy in the United States of America.
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II CLAIMANTS' ATTITUDES AND DECISION ABOUT THE 
COLLABORATION PERIOD
This analysis considers a financially distressed firm facing two types of claimants: 
stockholder and bondholder (or other lender). Both claimants have unbiased expectations about 
the firm's future operating profits; but may differ with regard to the degree of absolute risk 
aversion, assessment of the level of uncertainty involved in the firm's future operation and 
priority on the firm's liquidation proceeds. The analysis assumes that the financial crisis arises 
from the firm's current inability to pay back the bond value which matures in the present 
period. In liquidation, bond principal claim and interest payments would be paid first. It 
assumes further that, unless sufficiently compensated, the bondholder is not willing to extend 
the bond maturity period and calls for an immediate liquidation; whereas the stockholder 
considers backing the firm as long as his expected returns from doing so sufficiently exceeds 
the costs of keeping the firm solvent. These costs consist of the compensation payments 
required for keeping the bondholder at least as well off as under immediate liquidation while 
extending the bond's maturity period. Of course, when these costs exceed the stockholder's 
expected returns from continuation, he would also prefer immediate liquidation. Thus, the 
derivation of the broader condition for bankruptcy considers the case where the net returns to 
the stockholder from continuation are nonnegative.
Our mathematical analysis uses the following symbols:
T = the firm's liquidation date;
t = a continuous time index, 0 < t < T;
So = the sale value of the firm's present stock of productive assets (the plant);
Bo = the bond (or any other liabilities) claim against the firm at present;
JC(t) = the firm's operating profit at t;
5 = a fixed rate of depreciation of the firm's productive assets;
i = the bond interest rate;
Y = the bondholder subjective discounting rate;
P = the stockholder subjective discounting rate;
C = the present value of the compensation payment to the bondholder;
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ys(T) = the (random) present value of the net returns to the stockholder from 
continuation to T; and 
yb(T) = the (random) present value of the net returns to the bondholder from 
continuation to T.
The collaboration period (0,T) is determined by a consesnus reached by the firm's 
claimants. It is assumed, for simplicity, that the sale price of the firm's productive assets 
remains the same over time and that there is no income tax. In this case the present expected 
value of the net returns to the stockholder from keeping the firm solvent during the time interval 
(0,T) is the discounted sum of the operating profits plus the remaining assets minus the 
liabilities at the end of the period and the compensation payment to the bondholder:
T
E[ys(T)] = Je'P1 E[7t(t)] dt + S0e‘̂ T - B0e(i-P)T - C. (1)
0
The second term on the right hand side (RHS) of equation (1) is obtained from solving the 
motion equation of the firm’s assets S(t) = -8S(t) given the initial condition that S(0) = So- The 
third term on the RHS reflects the assumption that the interest on bond is accumulated and paid 
at T. The total debt is discounted by the stockholder subjective rate, p. Cash or other liquid 
assets are not included in equation 1. Their inclusion will not change the analysis considerably.
Correspondingly, the present value of the net returns to the bondholder from 
continuation are
yb(T) = B0e(i-Y)T + Q  (2)
As indicated by equation (1), the firm’s operating profits are a key factor in the 
determination of the net returns to the stockholders from continuation, and hence, in the 
determination of the length of the collaboration period. The operating profits are affected by the 
economic environment in which the firm acts. We assume that the firm operates in an
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oligopolistic industry consisting of N firms. Each firm is an expected proft maximiser which 
takes its competitors’ supply as given (i.e., zero conjectural variation), and is characterised by 
an identical and constant marginal cost of production (i.e., mcn(qn) = me for all qn and for 
every n = 1,...,N).
We further assume that the inverse demand function for the industry’s product consists 
of an isoelastic deterministic part and a stochastic part:
p(Q ,Y ,P) = Q-l/4 + 5 (P , Y). (3)
where Q is the quantity demanded; £, is the constant price elasticity of the deterministic part; Y 
and P are random variables with means Y and P and finite variances and covariance, denoting 
the aggregate consumer income and the overall price level of all the other goods, respectively. 
The stochastic part, p, is twice differentiable; py is positive (negative) in the case of a normal 
(inferior) good and is equal to zero otherwise; and pp is likely positive (negative) when the 
industry’s product is rather substitute (complementary) to the rest of the goods and zero 
otherwise. In order to introduce the effects of variations in the macroecnomic factors Y and P 
on the bankruptcy decision we consider the second-order Taylor approximation of the inverse 
demand function at the means’ point ( Y , P ):
p(Q, Y, P) = Q-l£ + py(Y - Y) + pP(P - P) + 0.5pyy(Y - Y)2
+ 0.5pPP(P - P)2 + 0.5pyp(Y - Y) (P - P ). (4)
The firm’s decision problem
N
max E{[p(Q, Y, P) - mc]qn} s.t. Q =  £  qn' (5)
qn n ' = 1
leads to the Cournot-Nash expected product price
E(p*) = ---------—{me - 0.5[pyy Var(Y) + ppp Var(P) + pyp cov (Y, P)]}. (6)
1 - 1/^N
5
(See the Appendix for a detailed solution of (5).)
The firm’s expected profit is given in our case by
E[7t(t)]„ = E[(p* - me) qn*] (7)
and since qn* is a chosen quantity and all the firms have an identical production operation, then
where Q* is the industry volume of sales. A priori, the signs of the second derivatives of p and 
cov(Y, P) are unknown; and hence the effects of variations in the macroeconomic factors as
expected operating profit are not clear. When [pyy Var(Y) + ppp Var(P) + pyp cov(Y, P)] is 
negative (positive) the expected profit is greater (smaller) than that under certainty (mcQ*/N(E,N 
- 1)). The discrepancy between the two decreases, however, with the level of the price 
elasticity and the number of producers.
It is assumed in the following that the expected profit remains the same. In view of this 
assumption, the substitution of equation 8 into equation 1 implies that the present expected 
value of the net returns to the stockholder from keeping the firm solvent during the period 
(0, T) is given by
E[n(t)]n = ^ [E (p * )-m c ]
mcQ* 0.5^Q* 
N(^N-l) $N-1
[PYY Var(Y) + ppp Var(P) + pyp cov(Y, P)] (8)
well as the effects of the degree of industry concentration and price elasticity on the firm’s
+ Soe'ST - Boe(i"P)T - C. (9)
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It is assumed that the firm claimants’ expectations about their net returns from 
continuation are unbiased, but reflect increased uncertainty as the collaboration period expands. 
More specifically, the claimants’ expected net returns from continuation to T, yse(T) and ybe(T), 
are normally distributed with means which are equal to the theoretical values presented by 
equation 9 and equation 2, respectively; and with variances which are proportional to the 
collaboration’s period, a s2T and Ob2T, respectively. This is equivalent to saying that the 
expected net returns to the stockholder and bondholder from continuation to T can be 
approximated by Wiener processes (Brownian motion).
It is postulated that both claimants maximise expected utility and that their preferences 
on the expected net returns can be represented by utility functions which, in order to simplify 
the mathematical analysis, reflect constant degrees of absolute risk aversion Rs and Rb, 
respectively:
Uj(yje(T)) = 1 - exp{- Rjyf(T)} for j = s, b. (10)
With this specification of U, the expected utility functions can be displayed as
OO
E(Uj) = 1 - J exp{-Rjyje(T)} <t>j(yf(T)) dyf(T) = 1 - m(-Rj) for j = s, b (11)
-O O
where m is the moment-generating function associated with the distribution of yje(T). Given 
e
that y. (T) is normally distributed
E(Uj) = 1 - exp {-RjE[yf (T)] + 0.5 Rj2oj2T } for j = s, b. (12)
Since the bondholder prefers an immediate liquidation (i.e., T = 0) upon continuation of 
the firm’s operation, unless sufficiently compensated, the Pareto optimal collaboration period 





E[Ub(ybe(T))] = E[Ub(ybe(0))]. (13)
The constraint reflects the compensation payment, C, required to keep the bondholder at least as 
well off as under immediate liquidation. In view of equations 12 and 2, this constraint can be 
rendered as
Rb[B0e(i''Y)T + C] - 0.5Rb2ob2T = RbB0- (14)
Hence,
C = B0[l - eO-Y)T] + 0.5 Rb c b2T. (15)
That is, in order to postpone the liquidation of the firm to T, the bondholder should be paid the 
foregone interest differential between his/her alternative financial activity and the firm’s bond 
plus the cost of risk-bearings which is equal to the perceived level of uncertainty associated 
with his/her net returns from continuation to T, multiplied by his/her degree of absolute risk 
aversion.
Summing up, the Pareto optimal collaboration period can be found by solving the 
stockholder decision problem
max {1 - exp{-RsE[ys(T)] + 0.5Rs2c s2T}} (16)
T
where E[ys(T)] is given by equation 9 and C by 15. Note that maximizing {1 - exp{- 
RsE[ys(T)] + 0.5Rs2a s2T}} is equivalent to maximising (E[ys(T)] - 0.5 Rso S2T}.
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III OPTIMAL COLLABORATION PERIOD AND THE CONDITION FOR
IMMEDIATE LIQUIDATION
The Pareto optimal collaboration period (T°) should satisfy the necessary condition for 
maximum:
-  ° 4 ! ~ -  t PYV Var(Y) +  ppp Var(P) +  ? Yp c o v ( Y ,  P ) ] l e -p l"  
IN(^N-I) ^N-l J
-5S0e-5T° - (i - p) BoeO-P)1,0 + (i-y)Boe(i-T)T° - 0.5Rbob2 - 0.5Rsa s2 = 0. (17)
Comparative statics and the second-order condition for maximum expected utility imply 
the following properties. First, the effect of the interest rate, i, on the collaboration period is 
not clear a priori. On the one hand, a higher interest rate on the firm’s loans will discourage the 
stockholder since it increases the firm’s liability accumulation. On the other hand, it enhances 
the attraction of the firm’s bond to the bondholder vis-a-vis alternative financial activities and 
hence decreases the compensation payment required for the bondholder’s collaboration.
Second, the effect of the stockholder’s subjective discounting rate, p, on the 
collaboration period is not clear, a priori. On the one hand, it decreases the sum of the 
discounted expected firm’s operating profits. On the other hand, it decreases the firm’s 
discounted liabilities accumulated during the period of collaboration.
Third, the higher the bondholder’s subjective discounting rate, y, the shorter the 
collaboration period. This is due to the increase in the compensation payment required for 
obtaining the bondholder’s collaboration.
Fourth, the greater the aversion of both the stockholder and the bondholder to risk, the 
shorter the collaboration period.
Fifth, the greater the variance of the aggregate variables Y and P and their covariance, 
the shorter (longer) the collaboration period provided that p y y » pp p  and pyp are positive 
(negative).





[PYY Var(Y) + pppVar(P) + pyp co v  (Y, P)]
= 5S0 + (Y-p) B0 + 0.5(Rbo b2 + RsOs2). (18)
This equation indicates that the financially distressed firm should be immediately forced into 
liquidation if the expected profit obtained from an infinitesimal continuation of the firm’s 
operation (the terms on the left hand side) is just equal to the cost of doing so in terms of: 
depreciation of the firm’s assets, foregone interest on alternative financial activity for the 
bondholder discounted by the stockholder rate of time preference, and the costs of risk-bearing 
for both claimants. Obviously, immediate liquidation is also optimal when the expected profit 
gained from infinitesimal continuation is overweighted by the costs. Note further that the 
probability of immediate liquidation increases (decreases) with the variances of the consumer 
aggregate income and the overall price level and their covariance, if pyy. Py p  and ppp are 
positive (negative), respectively.
IV SOME AGGREGATE FINDINGS FOR THE UNITED STATES
In the lines of the above analytical discussion of the bankruptcy condition we conduct 
an econometric analysis of the bankruptcy rate in the post-World War II U.S.A. business 
sector. Due to the absence of data at the industry level our empirical study is restricted to the 
effects of the variations of the aggregate variables Y and P. The empirical analysis uses the real 
gross national product (RGNP) in 1972 billion dollars and the gross national product deflator 
(GNPD) as proxies for the aggregate consumer income and the overall price level, respectively. 
The variances and the covariance of these variables are computed with quarterly observations 
provided by Gordon (1984) for the period started J quarters before the end of the t-th year. 
Thereby measuring the variations in the macoreconomic factors before and during the time of 
bankruptcy as indicated by the following equations.




Var (Pt) = |  I  (GNPDt.j - GNPD)2 (20)
J j =0
cov (Yt, Pt) = j  X (RGMVj - RGNP) (GNPDt.j - GNPD) (21)
j =0
where RGNP and GNPD are the averages of the real GNP and the GNP deflator, 
respectively, for the period started J quarters before the end of the t-th year.
The dependent variable, the rate of bankruptcies (ROB), is taken as the annual number 
of bankruptcies per 10,000 firms from The Business Failure Record (Dun and Bradstreet Inc., 
1984). The sample base consists of time-series observations for the years 1947-1982 (i.e., 
t = 1947,...,1982).
Best estimation results as regards goodness of fit and level of significance are obtained 
with a semilog specification and when J is set to be 16. The following equation summarises the 
ordinary least squares estimation results:
exp(ROBt) = 0.2439 x 10^8 + 0.3245 x 1035 Var(Yt)
(1.70) (3.02)
+ 0.1142 x 1037 Var(Pt) -0.4196 x 1036 cov (Yt, Pt) + errort. (22)
(7.43) (5.01)
The t-ratios are indicated by parentheses, R2 = 0.678, F = 19.61 and the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is 1.48. It is found that the estimation results are very robust with regard to our choice 
of J within the interval 12 < J < 24. They deteriorate significantly for either smaller or greater 
values of J. These results indicate that the variations of macroeconomic variables suggested by 
the theoretical analysis have a significant role in explaining business failure. The annual rate of 
bankruptcy in the U.S.A. increases with the variations of the GNP and the GNP deflator yet 
decreases with their covariation.
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Lack of data on bankruptcy rate at the industry level prevents the application of the 
empirical analysis to various industries in order to test the sensitivity of the coefficients of the 
bankruptcy rate regression equation to demand elasticity, level of concentration and the nature 
of the industry’s product.
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Appendix: Solution to the Firm Decision Problem
Given the second-order Taylor approximation of the inverse demand function, the 
firm’s objective function can be rewritten as
maxE{[Q-l£ + ? y(Y -Y ) + pP(P-P)  + 0.5 5yy(Y-Y)2 
qn
+ 0.5 ppp(P - P)2 + 0.5 pyp(Y - Y) (P - P) - me] qn} (A.l)
Taking exception of the objective function and recalling that the choice variable qn is 
deterministic and that E(Y - Y) = E(P - P) = 0, the objective function can be further written as
max {Q-l£ qn + 0.5[ pyYVar(Y) + pPP Var(P) + pYPcov(Y,P)]qn - me qn} (A.2) 
Qn
The first-order condition for maximum is
-(l/0 Q M /^q*n/Q* + Q*-1̂  - me + 0.5 [pYYVar(Y) + pYYVar(P) + pYPcov(Y,P)] = 0
(A. 3)
and since Q*-1̂  = E(p*) and q*n/Q* = 1/N (all firms have identical production operation).
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